IN 1123 KING BALDWIN II of Jerusalem was held captive by the Turkish Prince Balak in the dungeons of Khartpert fortress. Situated deep within Turkish territory, Khartpert was thought to be impregnable, and housed Balak’s harem and treasury as well as his captives. One day fifty Armenian monks approached the fortress’s gate, and asked to meet the governor in order to complain about some injustice done to them. They were in fact Crusader soldiers in disguise, who trekked over 150 kilometers of hostile country, crossing the wide Euphrates River and the formidable Anti-Taurus range en route. Once inside, the “monks” drew daggers from under their flowing clerical robes, and massacred the surprised garrison. They not only freed the king from his prison, but also gained control of Balak’s capital, his harem and his treasury.

As Balak learned to his dismay, special operations were not a modern invention. Medieval soldiers knew perfectly well that by using unconventional methods and striking against key targets, a few bold souls could within hours overturn the strategic and even political situation.
Assassinating and kidnapping enemy leaders, as well as rescuing friendly leaders, was probably the most cost-effective way of waging war in the age of chivalry. Since politics were a matter of personal ties, and since the borders of kingdoms and empires were shaped by family inheritance laws, the carefully calculated murder of a handful of individuals could redraw the map of Europe and the Middle East far more effectively than any number of battlefield victories.
 

Puny raiding parties that infiltrated and seized key strongholds could accomplish equally impressive results, where months of regular siege by thousands of soldiers often failed to accomplish anything. The destruction of infrastructure facilities such as bridges, dams and mills could occasionally cripple enemy communication and supply systems.
 

This book tells the story of many such special operations. It examines the methods used by assassins, kidnappers, raiders and saboteurs, and analyzes the strategic and political usage of such operations. The book argues that special operations played a crucial role in medieval and early modern war, occasionally deciding the outcome of entire campaigns and wars. The book further examines how these underhand operations fitted into chivalric culture, and paints an unconventional picture of war in the age of chivalry.

Yuval Noah Harari